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COMMENTS
PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS:
BALANCING QUALITY ASSURANCE AND
UTILIZATION REVIEW
As the result of escalating health care costs, health care financing has
changed dramatically in the past few years.' One of the most innovative
developments in this area has been the establishment of preferred provider
organizations ("PPOs").2 PPOs are difficult to define because there are no
well established guidelines governing their formation; consequently, as a
group, PPOs may be characterized more in terms of their diversity than
their similarity. In general, however, PPOs are arrangements through
which consumers are given financial incentives to utilize certain hospitals
and physicians, or "preferred providers." 4 While the consumer receives a
discount for utilizing the preferred provider, the provider is guaranteed in-
creased patient volume and efficient processing of claims.5 Because PPOs
are primarily cost-containment mechanisms, many physicians are concerned
that the quality of medical care may suffer at the expense of cost control.
6
There are others in the health care industry, however, who argue that there
is little basis for such concern.7 The purpose of this comment is to define the
1. Gabel, The Emergence and Future ofPPOs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 305, 305
(1986).
2. Gabel, Preferred Provider Organizations: Performance, Problems and Promise, 4
HEALTH Arr. 25, 25 (1985).
3. Id.
4. NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE
DELIVERY MECHANISMS; HMOs, PPOs & CMPS 11 (1986).
5. Id.
6. D.H. COWAN, PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 34 (1984). This concern has
been voiced by others in the health care industry as well. In May, 1985, The Physician's
Insurance Company of Michigan ("PICOM") informed its insured physicians that it intended
to change its underwriting guidelines with respect to physicians participating in HMOs or
PPOs in order to raise liability premiums for these physicians. PICOM finally withdrew the
guidelines at the request of the State's Special Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, but did not
rule out the eventual implementation of the guidelines in the event that statistical data begins
to reinforce its misgivings concerning HMOs and PPOs. Champney, Quality of Care and Mal-
practice Exposure: An Examination of One Challenge to HMOs, 7 GROUP HEALTH A. AM. J.
34 (1986).
7. Cowan, supra note 6, at 35. For example, the policy director for AARP, John Rother,
stated in 1985 that cost control made "hospitals more efficient ... eliminate[d] unnecessary
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general characteristics of PPOs, to discuss the factors which have facilitated
their development, to discuss the federal and state regulatory environments
in which they operate, and, finally, to examine the ability of PPOs to contain
costs while ensuring adequate quality of care for patients.
PPO's DEFINED
Since the structure of a PPO is determined largely by local market condi-
tions, there is no single definition which precisely describes such entities.' In
general, however, a PPO usually is described as an organization or arrange-
ment through which a group of hospitals and physicians, as well as other
health providers, agree to furnish services to a defined group of subscribers
on a discounted fee-for-service basis.9 Most PPOs consist of the following
components: a provider panel of preferred hospitals and physicians, negoti-
ated fee schedules, utilization review, freedom of choice for the consumer,
with monetary incentives to utilize preferred providers, and efficient process-
ing of provider claims.'O This structure, or arrangement, is designed to con-
trol costs in two ways; first, by establishing rigorous utilization review
mechanisms, PPOs are able to determine the most efficient providers of care;
second, by giving the consumer a monetary incentive to utilize PPO provid-
ers, the PPO ensures that, in most cases, the more efficient providers are
selected.'1,12 Usually the purchasers, rather than the PPO or the providers,
admissions, unnecessary tests and days in the hospital... [and] reduced exposure to diseases
caught in the hospital by hundreds of thousands of patients each year." N.Y. Times, July 30,
1985, at A4, col. 3.
8. Boland, Myths of Preferred Provider Contracting, 10 CHA INSIGHT 1, 1 (1986).
9. T. Rice, Preferred Provider Organizations: Report of the 1986 National Survey 1, 2
(1986) (unpublished Research and Statistics Note); de Lissovoy, Preferred Provider Orgainiza-
tions: Today's Models and Tomorrow's Prospects, 23 INQUIRY 7, 7-8 (1986); Tichon, infra note
31, at 5; Gabel, supra note 1, at 307; Gabel, supra note 2, at 26; Schwartz, The Preferred
Provider Organization As An Alternative Delivery System (Book Review), 6 J. LEGAL MED.
149, 150 (1985). PPOs have also been defined as "shortcut HMOs" because they are not
subject to extensive regulation and other orgainizational complications associated with HMOs.
Waxman, Panel Discussion, in ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS EXAMINE PREFERRED PRO-
VIDER ORGANIZATIONS 93, 93 (Nat'l Health Law. A. 1984).
10. de Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 7-8.
11. Tichon, infra note 31, at 5.
12. Some have argued that such monetary incentives effectively obviate any freedom of
choice on the part of the consumer. If the consumer is unable to pay the difference ("reim-
bursement differential"), then he or she will have no choice but to utilize the preferred pro-
vider. Approximately 20 states have attempted to resolve this issue by passing laws which
limit the reimbursement differential between PPO and non-PPO utilization. Forbes, Cut
Health Care Costs, Get Sued?, Dun's Business Month, July, 1986, at 39. See Hopkins, Re-
stricted Choice - A Liablity of Alternative Delivery Systems, 58 FLA. B. J. 145, 145-6 (1984);
Payson, PPOs: A Physician's Perspective, in ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS EXAMINE PRE-
FERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 35, 36 (Nat'l Health Law. A. 1984).
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assume the risk for excessive utilization. 3
PPOs are usually classified in terms of sponsorship categories. 4 The fol-
lowing are the six categories used in a 1986 national survey of PPOs ("1986
Rice National Survey"): (1) hospital sponsors, which include corporate hos-
pital chains and joint sponsorships by hospitals and physicians; (2) physician
sponsors, which include medical groups; (3) insurer sponsors, that is, com-
mercial insurers; (4) Blue Cross/Blue Shield sponsors; (5) investor sponsors;
and (6) other sponsors, such as union trusts and Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations ("HMOs"). 5 Although the numbers of sponsors within a particu-
lar category are changing rapidly as more organizations enter the PPO
market, hospital and Blue Cross/Blue Shield sponsored PPOs had the great-
est number of enrollees in the 1986 Rice National Survey.' 6 Between 1985
and 1986, however, enrollment in Blue Cross/Blue Shield sponsored PPOs
quadrupled, and enrollment in insurer sponsored PPOs doubled, compared
to fifty percent increases for hospital and physician sponsored PPOs.' 7 Re-
searchers predict that because commercial insurer sponsored PPOs are still
in the initial stages of development, this category may experience the great-
est growth in the near future.'" Since commercial insurers arguably possess
superior administrative resources, negotiating experience, and knowledge of
historical cost data and group benefits,' 9 they may have a competitive edge
over other types of sponsors.20
Regardless of sponsorship type, the potential for enrollment growth in
PPOs is enormous. Presently, sixty-five percent of PPO enrollment is con-
centrated in three states: California (thirty-nine percent), Colorado (seven-
teen percent), and Florida (nine percent).21 As restrictive provisions in state
legislation, such as freedom of choice and antidiscrimination statutes, 22
13. Gabel, supra note 1, at 307.
14. Rice, supra note 9, at 9-10; Rice, The State of PPOs: Results From a National Survey, 4
HEALTH AFF. 25, 25-40 (1985).
15. Rice, supra note 9, at 9-10.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 15-17.
19. de Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 10.
20. In addition, commercial insurers and investors may be more successful than hospital
or physician sponsored PPOs in controlling costs because there is no conflict of interest in
terms of filling hospitals beds and increasing patient volume. Interview with Jon Gabel, Health
Insurance Association of America in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1987) [hereinafter interview
with Jon Gabel]. Whether commercial insurers will be able to operate competitively to contain
costs without sacrificing quality of care, a concern of many phsicians, remains to be seen. See
de Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 8.
21. Rice, supra note 9, at 12-13.
22. Rolph, State Laws and Regulations Governing Preferred Provider Organizations, 1986
THE RAND CORPORATION 1. Although 49 of the 51 jurisdictions (the 50 states and Puerto
1988]
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which prevent selective contracting with providers or employers, are re-
pealed, PPO growth will continue.23
FACTORS FACILITATING PPO GROWTH
Several factors have contributed to the emergence of PPOs. A primary
factor has been the enormous increase in health care costs in the past few
years.24 By 1985, health care costs had increased so significantly that they
represented approximately eleven percent of the gross national product.25 A
second factor contributing to the development of PPOs and other cost con-
tainment mechanisms has been the decline in patient volume for physicians
and hospitals.26 This decline is attributable to a growing supply of new phy-
sicians each year, along with an increasing reluctance of patients to seek
medical assistance for nonemergency problems, possibly due to the shift of
additional liability for costs, in the form of premiums and co-payments to
the patient.27'2 ' Another reason for the decline in patient volume has been a
reduction in the number of individuals who are insured through private
health insurance due to increased levels of unemployment.29 The loss of
health care benefits by the unemployed has forced these people and their
families to forego necessary and nonemergency medical care.3° The growing
supply of physicians and decreased patient volume have created increased
financial pressures and growing competition among physicians and other
providers. 31 In addition, state and federal budget reductions, and an inabil-
ity to shift costs to private payers have also created a need for new methods
Rico) have statutes which could present obstacles to the establishment of PPOs, most jurisdic-
tions either have interpreted their statutes to allow the formation of PPOs, or have adopted
legislation overriding restrictive provisions. It appears that most state legislators desire to
encourage PPO growth. Id. at 32.
23. Rice, supra note 9, at 13. The 1986 survey indicated that eligibility had nearly tripled
since the 1985 survey, and that expansion into densely populated areas, such as New York, is
almost certain. Id. at 37.
24. Gabel, supra note 1, at 305.
25. Freedman, Megacorporate Health Care: A Choice for the Future, 312 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 579, 579 (1985).
26. Cowan, supra note 6, at 17.
27. Id. at 28.
28. In 1985, occupancy rates in community hospitals decreased below 65% and the
number of physicians per capita was predicted to increase 30% between 1981 and 1990. Ga-
bel, supra note 1, at 320.
29. Cowan, supra note 6, at 28.
30. Id. See Butler, New Initiatives in Financing and Delivering Health Care for the Medi-
cally Indigent: Report on a Conference, 13 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 225 (1985).
31. Tichon, PPOs: Definition and Background, in ATrORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS EX-
AMINE PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, 1-2 (Nat'l Health Law. A. 1984).
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of health care financing. 32
Perhaps the primary reason for the emergence of PPOs in the health care
marketplace is the increasing sophistication, and consequent increase in de-
mands and expectations, of corporate consumers of health care services.3 3
This "purchaser's revolution" is an aggressive response to increases in the
cost of health care34 which has resulted in increased deductibles and co-
payments, as well as mandatory second opinions for surgery.35 In fact, this
"purchaser's revolution" has sparked concern among health care providers
that there has been a shift from a scientific to a business orientation in health
care; and that the demands of corporate consumers for the restructuring of
health care financing are attempts to "relate the price of the product to the
cost of production," as in any other form of business.36
POTENTIAL PROBLEM FOR PPOs
As discussed above, PPOs have developed in response to changing condi-
tions in the health care marketplace. Because of escalating costs, an increas-
ing ratio of physicians to patients, and the demands of corporate buyers of
health care services, the primary purpose, and the greatest strength, of PPOs
is cost containment.37 There are, however, several potential problems which
might thwart the unhampered growth and efficient operation of PPOs which
must be considered.
The first potential problem which PPOs face is inconsistent regulation;
because PPOs are subject to rules which govern their sponsoring entities,
PPOs operating within a particular jurisdiction may be subject to quite dif-
ferent regulatory requirements.38 In addition, regulation of PPOs varies
from state to state, thus potentially posing substantial problems for sponsors
32. Id.
33. Aquilina, Increasingly Sophisticated Customers Forcing PPOs to Address Market
Needs, 25 MOD. HEALTHCARE 105, 105 (1985). See also Boland, The Concept of Managed
Health Care Systems, 5 NEWSHRIEFS 3 (1986). (Transition from "provider-based" market to
"purchaser-driven" market).
34. Gabel, supra note 1, at 319.
35. Gabel, supra note 2, at 32.
36. Freedman, supra note 25, at 579. Many health care providers fear that this shift will
cause a deterioration in the quality of health care because of the inherent conflict between
professionalism and entrepreneurialism. Horwitz, Quality Medical Care: Empiricism v. The
Gestalt, in the NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 1987 HEALTH LAW UPDATE 1,
23 (1987). This inherent conflict "is longstanding and unavoidable. Medicine and other pro-
fessions have historically distinguished themselves from business and trade claiming to be
above the market and pure commercialism. In the public's trust, professionals have set higher
standards of conduct for themselves than the minimal rules governing the marketplace..." Id.
at 23, n.35 (quoting Starr, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE).
37. See Gabel, supra note 2, at 27.
38. Rolph, supra note 22, at 69.
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desiring to implement multi-state PPOs 9 Furthermore, where state regula-
tion of insurance is particularly stringent, an employer may choose to self-
insure; as a result, the self-insured plan is exempt from state regulation, and
is subject to limited federal regulation under the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act ("ERISA").4° In the past, this disparity of treatment led
some in the private sector and in the government to suggest that PPOs
should be subject to uniform federal regulation. 41 Federal regulation, how-
ever, would have posed at least two problems. First, it would have necessi-
tated a substantial alteration in the division of federal and state power with
respect to insurance regulation. Second, since PPOs are not independent
entities, but creations of sponsoring bodies, PPOs would have been regulated
by federal law, while their sponsoring bodies would have continued to be
regulated by state law, an arrangement which would not have been practica-
ble.42 Despite an awareness of such impracticabilities, proposals for uniform
federal regulation reflected concern that state laws were restricting the devel-
opment of PPOs.4  Since many states have begun to take measures to allow
PPO formation, however, interest in federal legislation has waned.' The
most recent development with respect to PPO legislation has been the draft-
ing and adoption of model PPO provisions (the "Model Act") by the State
and Federal Health Insurance Legislative Policy (B) Task Force ("Task
Force") on December 6, 1986. 5 The purpose of the model legislation is to
provide guidelines to state policy makers for establishing minimum stan-
dards for preferred provider arrangements.46 47
A second potential problem for PPOs is the possibility of attack under the
39. Id. at 70.
40. Id.; Kosterlitz, States Increasing Their Regulation of Health Plans' Benefits, Eligibility
Rules, 52 NAT'L J., 2913, 2913 (1985). See Comment, ERISA Preemption of State Mandated
Provider Laws, 1985 DuKE L. J. 1194 (1985).
41. H.R. 2956, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983); Rolph, supra note 22, at 70.
42. Rolph, supra note 22, at 70.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Preferred Provider Arrangments Model Act (State and Federal Health Insurance Leg-
islative Policy (B) Task Force 1986).
46. Id. § 2. The establishment of minimum standards was not intended to suggest that
sponsors of PPOs would be acting unlawfully in states where PPO legislation has not been
enacted. Id.
47. The members of the Task Force were not unamimous in their adoption of the Model
Act. There was concern that § 6 of the Model Act established a higher standard of care for
PPO doctors than for others, and that the "Emergency Care" definition in § 3 was ambiguous.
Another concern was that the need for the Model Act is uncertain. Minutes from the meeting
of the State and Federal Health Insurance Legislative Policy (B) Task Force, Orlando, Florida
(Dec. 8, 1986).
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antitrust laws.48 Although the most common antitrust issue facing PPOs
has been illegal price fixing, other antitrust issues could include monopoliza-
tion, exclusive dealing, and geographic allocation of markets.4 9 To compli-
cate matters, PPOs have faced antitrust challenges not only by the federal
government, but also by providers excluded from the PPOs.5° Within the
past few years, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion have ameliorated this situation by indicating that within certain reason-
able boundaries, PPOs may have a procompetitive effect and should not be
discouraged.51 For this reason, antitrust issues, although still a concern for
sponsors structuring new PPOs, are no longer a formidable obstacle to the
operation of well established PPOs. 2
A third problem facing PPOs is their vulnerability to certain types of lia-
bility, such as vicarious medical malpractice liability and liability for physi-
cal injury resulting from the determination of a utilization review panel. 53
With respect to vicarious medical malpractice liability, a PPO could become
the defendant in this type of litigation if a member of the preferred provider
panel were to commit malpractice because the PPO could be the "deep
pocket" target of the lawsuit.54 In order to find such liability, PPOs must
48. Rolph, supra note 22, at 57. See generally, Calhoun, Public Policy and Antitrust En-
forcment in the Health Care Industry, 19 IND. L. REv. 55 (1986). Walsh, Provider-Sponsored
Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems: Reducing Antitrust Liability After Maricopa, 19 U.
RICH. L. REV. 297 (1985); Comment, Antitrust and California's New Preferred Provider Or-
ganization Legislation: A New Alternative in Health Care Cost Containment, 12 PEPPERDINE
L. REv. 121 (1984); Note, Preferred Provider Organizations and Provider Contracting: New
Analysis Under the Sherman Act, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 377 (1985); Hospitals Should Study PPOs'
Legal Issues, 14 HOSPITALS 20 (1983).
49. Rolph, supra note 22, at 57. A comprehensive discussion of these antitrust issues is
beyond the scope of this comment. It should be noted, however, that price fixing, monopoliza-
tion, exclusive dealing and geographic allocation of markets are restricted by the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). Section 1 of the Act states that "every contract,
combination ... or conspiracy ... in restraint of trade" is illegal. Section 2 provides that
"[e]very person who shall monopolize ... any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States... shall be deemed guilty..."
50. Id. at 59. See Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir.
1986).
51. Rolph, supra note 22, at 59.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Lemkin, PPO" Utilization Review, in ATTORNEYS AND PHYSICIANS EXAMINE PRE-
FERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 49, 54-57 (Nat'l Health Law. A. 1984); J. RICH, STATE
LAWS REGULATING PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 1, 90-92 (Mar. 6, 1986)
(Memel, Jacobs, Pierno, Gersch & Ellsworth Report prepared under subcontract to the Rand
Corporation); Rolph, supra note 22, at 64-65; Rice, supra note 9, at 36.
54. Rolph, supra note 22, at 64; Rich, supra note 53, at 90. "Vicarious liability" is defined
in Black's Law Dictionary as "indirect legal responsibility." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1404
(5th ed. 1979). "Malpractice" is defined as "[p]rofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of
skill." In order to recover for medical malpractice, it is necessary to show that (1) the physi-
19881
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screen carefully the credentials of potential providers, and monitor the per-
formance of participating providers.
55
An equal, if not greater, threat to the successful operation of PPOs is lia-
bility resulting from utilization review determinations.5 6 Many physicians
strongly oppose the use of utilization review or "cost efficient" medicine
which, in effect, determines the medical necessity of their decisions, as harm-
ful, if not antithetical, to a high standard of medical care.57 Utilization re-
view, however, is the primary mechanism through which PPOs control
costs.5" Therefore, it is unlikely that PPOs will respond to concerns of phy-
sicians by eliminating utilization review.5 9 PPOs must respond to these con-
cerns in some fashion, however, or the quality of care offered by preferred
providers may suffer." Furthermore, if a patient is discharged prematurely
based on the decision of a utilization review panel, and the patient suffers an
injury as the result, the PPO could be subject to liability.6 1
UTILIZATION REVIEW METHODS
The manner in which a utilization review panel performs its functions is
critical since such methods could expose a PPO to liability or, if structured
carefully, insulate it from liability.6 2 In general, PPOs incorporate one or
more of the following components in their utilization review programs:
(1) pre-admission review, which determines the medical necessity of a sched-
uled inpatient admission, and generally applies to expensive procedures and/
or procedures provided on an outpatient basis; (2) admission review and cer-
tification, which determines the medical necessity of unscheduled inpatient
admissions or other admissions not covered by pre-admission review;
cian owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the duty, or applicable standard of care, was violated;
(3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and (4) the physician's violation of the duty, or applicable
standards of care, caused the injury. Id. at 864. Vicarious medical malpractice liability, there-
fore can be described as indirect legal responsibility for the professional misconduct or lack of
skill of a physician who caused an injury in violation of a duty owed to a patient.
55. Rolph, supra note 22, at 64.
56. Id. Rich supra note 53, at 91; Rice, supra note 9, at 36.
57. Lemkin, supra note 53, at 50. But see Becker, Utilization Review - Review Can Cut
Employer Costs Without Sacrificing Quality Care, Bus. INs., February 17, 1986, at 45, 46 (utili-
zation review may actually enhance quality of care).
58. Boland, supra note 8, at 3; Aquilina, supra note 33, at 106; Cowan, supra note 6, at 31;
Gabel, supra note 1, at 312.
59. See Cowan, supra note 6, at 34-35.
60. See Stromberg, Utilization Review and the Law, 13 REGISTER REPORT 3, 3-4 (1986).
But see Cowan, supra note 6, at 34-35.
61. Wickline v. State, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, reh'g granted, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 560, 727 P.2d 753 (1986).
62. Aronson, Liability and Utilization Review, in 1985 NATIONAL HEALTH LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION: LEGAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES IN HMOS, PPOS & CMPS 1, 1.
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(3) concurrent review or length of stay certification, which determines the
medical necessity of a continued hospital stay; (4) second opinions for elec-
tive surgery programs; (5) gatekeeping, which determines, in a variety of
ways, whether or not a patient should be seen; (6) retrospective claims re-
view, which determines retroactive disallowances of payments for utilization
abuses; (7) physician profiling, which monitors physician performance; and
(8) terminating physicians.63 Almost all PPOs use pre-admission certifica-
tions, and most use concurrent review, unless the hospital is being paid based
upon diagnosis related to groups ("DRGs"). 64 Second opinion surgery and
gatekeeping programs are used much less often,65 and the use of retrospec-
tive claims review is declining, possibly because it is not as effective as pro-
spective or concurrent review.6 6 Physician profiling is becoming an
increasingly important component of utilization review programs,67 perhaps
because of the threat to PPOs of vicarious medical malpractice liability.68
Termination of physicians on a formal basis has been used by several PPOs,
and some predict additional terminations as soon as their physician profiling
systems locate utilization abuses.69
Utilization review may be conducted by the provider, the PPO, or an in-
dependent third party.70 Unfortunately, each of these types of review panels
has inherent weaknesses which could be difficult to overcome. Provider
sponsored utilization review panels have been criticized because of their con-
flicting interests: the obligation to prevent over-utilization and the desire to
fill hospital beds. 7' Since hospitals enter PPOs primarily to remedy a decline
in patient volume, they may not be inclined to conduct stringent utilization
review, thus further reducing their numbers of patients.72 Some describe
provider utilization review panels as "foxes guarding the henhouse," and
63. Lemkin, supra note 53, at 51-52; Aronson, supra note 62, at 3; Rice, supra note 9, at
32-35.
64. Rice, supra note 9, at 32. "DRGs" can be defined as "a classification system which
groups patients according to principal diagnosis, presence of a surgical procedure, age, pres-
ence or absence of significant comorbidities or complications, and other relevant criteria." See
Comment, Diagnosis Related Groups and the Price of Cost Containment, 2 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 305, 306 (1986).
65. One exception to the less frequent use of second opinion programs appears to be use
by commercial insurers. In 1985, these sponsors required second opinions in twice as many
programs as any other sponsor. de Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 11.
66. Rice, supra note 9, at 32.
67. Id. at 35.
68. Rolph, supra note 22, at 64.
69. Rice, supra note 9, at 35.
70. Lemkin, supra note 53, at 50.
71. Id.
72. de Lissovoy, supra note 9, at 9.
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doubt the ability of providers to perform utilization review effectively.73 For
this reason, review panels established by the PPOs themselves and independ-
ent third party utilization review firms are becoming, and will continue to
become, the primary organizations responsible for monitoring utilization
and containing costs. 74
Because outside utilization panels are concerned primarily with ensuring
less expensive care, many physicians and health care specialists argue that
there is a danger that quality may suffer. 75  Unquestionably, proper utiliza-
tion review can cut costs while protecting the interests of the patient by elim-
inating unnecessary procedures, medications and hospitalizations.76
However, utilization review which focuses principally on increased savings
and productivity, and induces physicians to make decisions based on eco-
nomic pressure, for example, through loss of business or termination, ex-
poses the patient to injury and, consequently, the PPO to unlimited
liability.77 With such utilization review:
[t]he transaction between physician and patient becomes a com-
modity transaction. The physician becomes an independent entre-
preneur or the hired agent of entrepreneurs and investors who
themselves have no connection with the traditions of medical eth-
ics. The physician begins to practice the ethics of the market place,
to think of his relationship with the patient, not as a covenant or
trust, but as a business and a contract relationship . . .. Medical
knowledge becomes proprietary; the doctor's private property to be
sold to whom he chooses at whatever price and conditions he
chooses.78
This concern about liability resulting from economic rationing of care is
not unfounded; in the past several years providers have been held liable for
73. Id.; Lemkin, supra note 53, at 50. There are, however, some potential advantages for
a PPO which contracts with a hospital for utilization review; the review structure may already
be in place; the hospital already has a comprehensive database listing all patients; and the
hospital's ethical and legal obligations assure that standards for review will be uniformly ap-
plied to all patients. Kloss, QUALITY REVIEW AND UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT, in THE
NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET - A GUIDE To PPOs FOR PURCHASERS, PAYORS AND PROVID-
ERS 680, 684-85 (P. Boland ed. 1985).
74. Interview with Jon Gabel, supra note 20.
75. Lemkin, supra note 53, at 50; Cowan, supra note 6, at 34.
76. See Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 30 (1986). Many unnecessary tests and hospitalizations are
being ordered by physicians who fear malpractice suits. The practice of such "defensive
medicine" to protect against litigation cannot justify the additional costs and risk to the pa-
tient. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 32.
78. Id. at 32-33.
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premature discharge, admissions delays and transfers for financial reasons.79
Moreover, in a recent California case, Wickline v. State, a third-party payor
was sued for the first time for personal injury due to a utilization review
determination.8"
THE WICKLINE CASE
Wickline represents the first attempt to impose liability for malpractice
upon a third-party payor for its decisions under a cost-containment, or utili-
zation review, program.8" The issue in the case was whether the third-party
payor had a legal responsibility for injury when its utilization review pro-
gram influenced or overruled the treating physician's judgment.82 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals recognized the seriousness of this issue, especially in
cases of prospective, as opposed to retrospective, utilization review.83 When
retrospective review is used, erroneous decisions result in wrongfully with-
holding reimbursement; when prospective review is used, pressures on qual-
ity care created by cost control strategies could result in permanent disability
or death. 84
The facts in Wickline are fairly straightforward. On January 6, 1977, the
plaintiff, a woman in her mid-forties, was admitted to a hospital for surgical
treatment of Leriche's Syndrome, a condition caused by obstruction of the
terminal aorta immediately above the point at which the aorta divides into
two common iliac arteries descending into the legs.85 Because the disease
was in an advanced state, Dr. Polonsky, a specialist in peripheral vascular
surgery, determined that a piece of the plaintiff's artery should be removed
from the right leg, and a synthetic graft should be inserted in its place.86
Following the plaintiff's surgery, she experienced several complications: sev-
eral hours after surgery, a clot formed in the graft and was removed in a
second operation; several days later, she began having spasms in the vessels
in her lower leg, requiring Dr. Polonsky to perform a right lumbar sympa-
thectomy, a procedure in which a section of a chain of nerves located on the
right side of the spine was removed, in an attempt to stop the spasms.87
Several days after the lumbar sympathectomy, Dr. Polonsky decided that it
was medically necessary for the plaintiff to remain in the hospital for another
79. Stromberg, supra note 60, at 4.
80. 228 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
81. Id. at 663.
82. Id. at 662.
83. Id. at 663.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 663-64.
86. Id. at 664.
87. Id.
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eight days for observation; his reasons for extending the plaintiff's hospital
stay were the fear of clotting and/or infection, and the possibility that an
unexpected emergency might occur."8
In order to extend the patient's hospital stay, Dr. Polonsky was required
to submit his request to a representative of the third-party payor, Medi-Cal,
for approval.8 9 The Medi-Cal representative physician, Dr. Glassman, de-
nied Dr. Polonsky's request for an eight-day extension and authorized an
extension for only four days.' The representative testified that his decision
was based on factors such as the plaintiff's temperature, diet and digestion,
and the fact that the plaintiff was able to walk with assistance.9 Based on
these factors, the representative assumed that the plaintiff's condition was
not critical and that she was making satisfactory progress. 92 Although Dr.
Polonsky could have attempted to appeal Medi-Cal's decision to limit his
request, he did not do so. 9' Dr. Polonsky testified that he had two reasons
for acquiescing: first, although he believed that the patient was seriously ill
and still in danger, her condition had not deteriorated and no new symptoms
had developed; second Dr. Polonsky felt that Medi-Cal had the authority to
override his decisions, as a treating physician, in determining when to dis-
charge a patient from the hospital.94
In the first days after her discharge from the hospital, the plaintiff began
to experience pain and noticed loss of color from her leg.95 Nine days after
her discharge, when her leg became bluish and nothing could be done to
alleviate the pain, the plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital. 96 Upon exam-
ination, Dr. Polonsky discovered that the plaintiff had developed an infec-
88. Id. at 665.
89. Id. at 664. Dr. Polonsky was required to furnish the hospital with a diagnosis, his-
tory, status and treatment plan for the plaintiff. The hospital, in turn, was obligated to use the
information in completing Medi-Cal's "MC-180" form and to submit the form to Medi-Cal's
representative for review. Based on the MC-180, the Medi-Cal representative was responsible
for determining the medical necessity of the request. Id. at 665.
90. Id. at 666.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Court stated that it was reasonable to conclude, based upon the record, that
Dr. Glassman did not obtain an opinion from a specialist in peripheral vascular surgery before
deciding to discharge Mrs. Wickline.
93. Id. at 667.
94. Id. Dr. Polonsky's understanding that Medi-Cal was authorized to override his medi-
cal judgment is indicative of the concern that utilization review panels may pressure physicians
to make decisions based on economic factors such as fear of termination of preferred provider
status or staff privileges rather than based on medical ethics. See Pellegrino, supra note 76. It
should be noted, however, that all of the medical witnesses who testified at trial agreed that Dr.
Polonsky acted within the standards of the medical community in discharging Mrs. Wickline
when he did. 228 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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tion at the site of the graft, that she had developed clots in the right leg, and
that there was no circulation in the leg.97 Because of the infection, Dr.
Polonsky could not remove the clot surgically.9" Attempts to save the leg
through other methods, such as the use of antibiotics, anticoagulants, and
warm water whirlpool baths, were unsuccessful.9 9 Finally, in two operations
on February 8, 1977 and February 17, 1977, Dr. Polonsky amputated the
plaintiff's leg."°°
In the resulting lawsuit, the plaintiff sued Medi-Cal for negligently causing
her to be discharged prematurely from the hospital."0' The trial court
awarded judgment to the plaintiff,10 2 but on appeal, the judgment was re-
versed. 10 3 The court of appeals held that the third-party payor was not lia-
ble for damages"° emphasizing that the reason that Medi-Cal was not liable
was because Dr. Polonsky accepted the Medi-Cal determination without
protest; he did not attempt to appeal the Medi-Cal decision and therefore
could not blame Medi-Cal for his own mistake.0 5 If Dr. Polonsky had ap-
pealed the Medi-Cal decision, and his appeal had been denied, Medi-Cal
would have been liable."° In its opinion the court stated that:
[t]he patient who requires treatment and who is harmed when care
which should have been provided is not provided should recover
for the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the depriva-
tion of such care, including, when appropriate, the health care pay-
ers. Third-party payers of health care services can be held legally
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from
defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mech-
anisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf
for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably
disregarded or overridden.'0 7
Based on the language above, it would appear that if a utilization review
panel arbitrarily denies appeals by a health care provider for medical or hos-
pital care, such action could expose the third-party payor to unlimited mal-,
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. On February 8th, Dr. Polonsky removed the plaintiff's leg below the knee. When
the upper leg did not heal after the first operation, Dr. Polonsky was forced to amputate the
leg above the knee on February 17th. Id.
101. Id. at 662-63.
102. Id. at 662.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 672.
105. Id. at 671.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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practice liability.' °8 Therefore, in order to protect patients against injury
and to provide safeguards against litigation, third party payers such as PPOs
must establish quality assurance mechanisms to balance the cost contain-
ment goals of utilization review.' °9
QUALITY ASSURANCE
A. In General
Ensuring that patients receive adequate medical care was a concern of
physicians long before the development of PPOs." ° Traditionally, physi-
cians have reviewed the competence of their peers through state agencies and
local medical societies."' In addition, hospitals are responsible for monitor-
ing the performance of their medical staffs in order to maintain their accredi-
tation' 12 and to minimize the risk of liability." 3  In 1972, Congress
established Professional Standards Review Organizations ("PSROs"), re-
view organizations composed of physicians, which were established in order
to monitor quality of care and utilization review of services provided under
Medicare." 4 In 1982, Congress reorganized the PSRO program, replacing
PSROs with utilization and quality control Peer Review Organizations
("PROs"),"' which have been more successful in pinpointing abuses." 6
There is some concern, however, that PROs focus primarily on cost contain-
ment, and are not particularly effective in preventing poor quality of care. I7'.
One possible explanation for this weakness may be that quality care is diffi-
cult to define or to measure." 8
B. Standards for Quality Care
Although no single definition or measure of quality has proved acceptable
108. Id. See Horowitz, supra note 36, at 46-47.
109. Forbes, supra note 12, at 38-40; Stromberg, supra note 60, at 3-4.
110. Donabedian, Twenty Years of Research on the Quality of Medical Care, 8 EVALUA-
TION & HEALTH PROF. 243 (1985); See, Comment supra note 64, at 317-18.
111. Comment, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State Legisla-
ture Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehensive Reform,
52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135, 144-45 n. 49 (1986); See Council on Medical Service, Quality of
Care, J. A.M.A. 1032 (1986).
112. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals requires all accredited hospitals
to establish review panels. Comment, supra note 111, at 145 n.49.
113. Hospitals may be held liable for malpractice committed by staff physicians. Id.
114. Comment, supra note 64, at 318.
115. Id.
116. See Pellegrino, supra note 76, at 36.
117. Stromberg, supra note 60, at 3.
118. Cowan, supra note 6, at 35.
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to the health care community," 9 the definition formulated by the Council on
Medical Service for the American Medical Association ("AMA") provides a
general indication of the aspirations of the medical community. The Council
has defined high quality care as that which "consistently contributes to im-
provement or maintenance of the quality and/or duration of life." 120 The
Council has also established eight "essential elements of quality" which
should be included in any program designed to ensure adequate medical
care. 12 1 These factors are as follows: (1) the production of optimum im-
provement in the patient's physical condition and comfort; (2) the promo-
tion of prevention and early detection of disease; (3) the timely
discontinuation of unnecessary care; (4) the cooperation and participation of
the patient in the care process; (5) the skilled use of necessary professional
and technological resources; (6) concern for the patient's welfare; (7) effi-
cient use of resources; and (8) sufficient documentation of medical records to
ensure continued care and for evaluation of the care by peer review.,
22
Recently, as conditions have changed in the marketplace, and cost con-
tainment forms of health care financing have emerged, concerns regarding
quality of care have grown.' 23 Because quality is so difficult to define, vari-
ous standards have emerged as measurements.' 24  One set of standards
which has developed in the past few years has been that established for
HMOs. HMOs, which are subject to more regulation than PPOs,12 1 have
been required to administer comprehensive quality assurance programs in
order to meet statutory and regulatory requirements.1
26
The National Committee for Quality Assurance ("NCQA"), incorporated
119. Id.
120. Council on Medical Service, supra note 111, at 1032. The most striking characteristic
of this definition is its lack of specificity. It is arguable that, in order to propose a definition at
all, the Council was obligated to use only the most general terms. Another definition of quality
which illustrates, if nothing else, the inability to define the term precisely, is the "component of
the difference between efficacy and effectiveness that can be attributed to care providers, taking
into account the environment in which they work." Horowitz, supra note 36, at 3.
121. Council on Medical Service, supra note 111, at 1032.
122. Id. In addition, the Council has prepared guidelines designed to facilitate adherence
to these goals which focus on the type of review mechanisms necessary to assure high quality
care. These guidelines are similar to those structured by the National Committee for Quality
Assurance ("NCQA") for HMOs, which will be discussed infra.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 24-36; Quality of Care Proposals Need Support, 17
MOD. HEALTHCARE 5 (1987).
124. Board of Trustees Report, AMA Initiative on Quality of Medical Care and Professional
Self Regulation, 256 J. A.M.A. 1036 (1986).
125. See Waxman, supra note 9, at 93.
126. Section 1031(c)(7) of the Public Health Service Act requires that each qualified HMO
shall " . . . have organizational arrangements, established in accordance with regulations of
the Secretary, for an ongoing quality assurance program for its health services which program
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in 1979, with the support of the Group Health Association of America
("GHAA") and the American Medical Care and Review Association ("AM-
CRA"), is responsible for monitoring the quality assurance programs of
HMOs, and, in this capacity, has formulated standards by which it measures
an HMO program. 12 7 These standards, which are designed to accommodate
various organizational structures, are as follows:
1. Organizational arrangements appropriate to the HMO's goals,
including:
(a) a quality assurance committee,
(b) accountability to the HMO,
(c) participation from providers with sufficient support staff,
(d) supervision by an HMO physician,
(e) regularly scheduled meetings,
(f)' records reflecting actions of the committee.
2. Defined methods for identification and selection of administrative
and clinical problems;
3. Established methods for problem evaluation;
4. Development of appropriate recommendations;
5. Adequate follow-up on recommendations; and
6. Periodic evaluation of effectiveness of the program. 128
Another method which has been suggested for monitoring and assessing
quality of care is the use of audit reports, in which medical records are ex-
amined by independent physician auditors following the patient's dis-
charge.'29  Audits, in which physician auditors are instructed to limit
findings to egregious defects in care, presumably provide "performance
snapshots" of a provider's quality of care.' 30 The proponents of auditing
suggest that the results of quality care audits could be provided to potential
customers as an additional source of information to use in choosing a health
provider or plan.' 3
A more recent development in the area of quality assurance standards has
been a proposal by the AMA that the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
(A) stresses health outcomes, and (B) provides review by physicians and other health profes-
sionals of the process followed in the provision of health services;"
The regulations regarding quality assurance in HMOs are set forth, in part, at 42 C.F.R.
§ 110.108(h).
127. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE, Policy Statement (February,
1986).
128. Id. at 13-15.
129. Milstein, Auditing Quality of Care: An Employer Based Approach, 3 Bus. & HEALTH
10 (1986).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 12.
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Hospitals ("JCAH") should receive a "sole source contract" to develop stan-
dards of care for the health care industry as a whole. 132 The AMA sug-
gested that because the JCAH is an independent organization with no vested
interests, it would be an ideal coordinator for the program to determine
which statistics most accurately measure quality.1 33
C. Quality Assurance in PPOs
Very little information is available with respect to quality assurance in
PPOs for several reasons. 134 One explanation is that because of their recent
development and the desire of sponsors to obtain a competitive share of the
market, the goals of PPOs are first, to contract with preferred providers, and
second, to establish utilization review mechanisms which control costs; qual-
ity assurance programs are a secondary consideration and, therefore, not dis-
cussed widely.' 33 A second explanation is that because there are so few
providers participating in PPOs, it is difficult to make comparisons, an essen-
tial element of a quality assurance program. 136 A third explanation is that
because PPOs are relative newcomers in the health care marketplace, there
is a desire to encourage their growth.' 3 7 As PPOs become well established
and begin to hold a substantial share of the market, they will be scrutinized
more carefully by the government, consumers and competitors. 3 '
This apparent desire to encourage growth of PPOs, rather than to subject
them initially to extensive regulation is reflected by the absence of quality
assurance provisions in state law.' 3 9 Of the twenty-two states which have
enacted enabling statutes for PPOs, only fourteen have included provisions
to protect consumers." ° Of those fourteen, only two states, Utah and Mich-
igan, have strong quality assurance provisions which require PPOs to estab-
lish programs to review care or services.' 4' Many state regulators have
stated that they are reluctant to create specific regulatory controls prospec-
tively, and that they prefer to grapple-with problems as they develop.'
42
132. McGraw-Hill, Utilization Review Letter 2 (Dec. 18, 1986).
133. Id.
134. Interview with Jon Gabel, supra note 20.
135. Telephone interview with S. Edward Pickens, Director of Special Projects, American
Medical Care Review Association (Jan. 8, 1987).
136. Id.
137. Interview with Richard Sorian, Editor of Medicine & Health, McGraw-Hill, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Jan. 8, 1987).
138. Id.
139. See Rolph, supra note 22, at 49.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 51.
142. Id. at 69.
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CONCLUSION
The emergence and continued growth of PPOs appears to provide a much
needed solution to the dilemma of soaring costs, an overabundance of physi-
cians, and a dearth of patients. By creating monetary incentives for consum-
ers to utilize preferred providers, by guaranteeing patient volume to
hospitals and physician providers, and by containing costs through utiliza-
tion review, PPOs seem to provide a palatable financing product for both
consumers and health care providers. As PPOs continue to grow and spread
throughout the nation, such problems as inconsistent regulations and anti-
trust violations probably will be resolved quickly.
The most distressing problem facing PPOs today is an apparent inability
to balance cost containment and quality of care. Granted, cost containment
is the raison d'etre for PPOs. Without comprehensive utilization review,
PPOs could not contain costs and, therefore, would not be able to compete
effectively in the marketplace. Cost containment, however, cannot be used
as an excuse for sacrificing quality of care, for if quality suffers, so do
patients.
For this reason, it is critical that utilization review mechanisms be struc-
tured so that costs are contained while quality of care is ensured. This not
only protects patients, but may protect the PPO from liability as well. As
PPOs expand and acquire a greater share of the market, the potential for
problems with utilization review will increase. If utilization review determi-
nations are made arbitrarily or solely with regard to cost, it is clear that
cases such as Wickline will continue to develop.
The absence of well defined standards for quality assurance programs
within the industry and state regulations could pose a serious problem for
the continued growth of PPOs. First of all, PPOs should be governed by the
same ethical considerations which govern their providers. In fact, PPOs
should not be allowed to operate unless they are willing to assure quality
care for patients. Second, from a purely practical, business-oriented stand-
point, PPOs will function more effectively by taking preventative measures
to insulate themselves from malpractice liability by ensuring high quality
care. Although there is some concern that imposing quality assurance con-
trols on PPOs may hamper their growth, it is apparent that there are several
options open to the industry in establishing standards for quality. First,
since quality of care is admittedly difficult to define or measure, the health
care community does not have rigid standards demanding absolute compli-
ance. This appears to give PPOs substantial flexibility in setting national,
geographic or structure oriented standards. Second, since the NCQA's
HMO standards were designed specifically to accommodate various organi-
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zational structures, PPOs already have a workable prototype upon which to
devise their own programs. Third, a less structured alternative might be
auditing quality of care. In this case, however, some mechanism would need
to be established in order to implement changes based on the results of the
audits. A fourth alternative would be to adopt the JCAH standards when
they are published. Whatever the choice, however, PPOs must assume some
responsibility for quality assurance in order to protect both patients and
themselves.
Cost containment and quality assurance are both necessary and beneficial
goals of PPOs. They should not be viewed, however, as conflicting goals,
one of which must be sacrificed for the other. PPO sponsors should strive to
balance the two in creating a superior form of health care financing.
Cathy L. Burgess

